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AUTONOMY AND RIGHTS: DIGNITY AND
RIGHT
John A. Most, M.D.*
It was a nice and appealing concept. It was easy to talk of in glowing
terms as long as it stayed properly in the realm of theory. But when au-
tonomy began intruding into raw economics, first in the realm of man-
aged care and then in the minds of those who were trying to cobble out a
system of medical care for all that would, as the pundits have it, "play in
Peoria," it became a cause of consternation.
The ascent to the first place of the concept of autonomy among the
precepts of bioethics prefigures the tension that plagues discussion and
debate about the future of medical care, its spiralling costs, and the na-
tional concern about how the bills will be paid. While it is not unani-
mously conceded that a system of rationing or strict allocation will be
found necessary, the realization is growing that we cannot, under any sys-
tem, provide everything wanted by all comers without the imposition of
some limits.
The ordination of respect for dignity emerged from the Belmont Con-
ference in the 1970s as the first principle of bioethics. It shortly under-
went a subtle transmogrification. Autonomy is not, to be sure, a synonym
for dignity, but a description of one of its attributes. Born of concepts
enunciated by Emmanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill as the right to be let
alone, autonomy has grown from the right to have nothing done to one's
person without one's consent to a positive moral right to do what one
wants, or to claim-exercise a right-to have whatever treatment is avail-
able. Thus, from the strength of a negative moral imperative, some have
sought to extend the same power to the positive side. Which is to say, in
the case of medical care, that one has a right to have anything done that
one wishes. This is a utilitarian change that even Mill would have been
unlikely to accept.
The probable reason for this shift of emphasis to autonomy was a reac-
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tion to the rampancy of paternalism; the notion that the doctor knows
best and the patient takes whatever has been decreed.
The change in the way we think about dignity-the canonization of a
single attribute and its translation into the language of rights-is now be-
coming troublesome. It is necessary to make distinctions. The most
needed distinction concerns the essence of dignity.
Dignity is an inseparable element of humanness. It is both inherent in
and necessary to our humanity that we possess dignity. It is desirable that
we invoke, as a quality of that dignity, the'right to be let alone. As a
negative moral imperative this is much more binding than its positive
counterpart, the right to do what one wishes (or to claim to have done to
one anything one wishes). This carries a weaker force, and one may com-
pare it to the obligation to do no harm, which is absolute, and the duty to
do good, which is binding only in situations where it is possible and feasi-
ble to do so.
Perhaps dignity was too vague a construct for the framers of the early
codes of bioethics to find salable. It has an ethereal quality, evoking
images of formally clad figures, even of warriors or goddesses, a likeness
struck on a coin of the realm. It would be difficult to advocate any uni-
versal aspiration to this, and in the further analysis, it would be something
difficult to pitch, simply because it is so vague.
But autonomy, as it has become enshrined today, is going to be hard to
live with in a time of scarcity. A recounting of recent, almost back-to-
back, cases from the same corner of the world will illustrate some
difficulties.
Nancy Cruzan's case' saw an interpretation of the right to be let alone
carried all the way to the United States Supreme Court, and while it was
not a part of the Court's final written opinion, it was enunciated by Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor and others in their quite forceful concurring
opinions. This right then gained further recognition as law of the land in
the Danforth legislation, which came to be known as the Patient Self De-
termination Act. However, it is to be noted that only the right to refuse
treatment is covered.
Within months of Cruzan, trouble loomed on the horizon. A very old,
vegetative patient named Helga Wanglie was being maintained on life
support in a milieu populated by some of the principals who fought hard
1. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (O'Connor and Scalia,
J.J., concurring) (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., dissenting) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing in a separate opinion).
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for the verdict -in Cruzan. The neurological diagnosis was certain, or as
certain as any such diagnosis could be. It was even accepted by her hus-
band, who stood firm by his demand that she be kept alive at all costs. It
was his wish, and moreover it was his wife's wish, clearly stated to him
and known to him. The Wanglies were devout Lutherans and held, as a
matter of faith, that life should be preserved at whatever cost. (Quite
incidentally, the cost of treatment was being borne by the couple's insur-
ance carrier and could not be claimed as a burden by the caregiver). But
the treatment was, in some calculus at least, futile because no recovery
could be expected.
The caregivers sought to have Mr. Wanglie removed as his wife's proxy.
However, the court ruled that the caregivers failed to establish a prima
facie case. Moreover, the court determined that Mrs. Wanglie's wishes
were accurately represented by her husband, and he was competent to
express them. The probable appeal, or the future approach contending
futility, was mooted by Mrs. Wanglie's death. She had won and, perhaps
in some ghostly way, the court decision had provided her a nunc dimittis.
But was not Mr. Wanglie exercising his wife's autonomy? If we con-
cede that autonomy is an unrestricted right, given the same weight as the
right to not be kept alive artificially, successfully claimed by the proxy
decisionmaker for Nancy Cruzan, then we are at loggerheads. The alter-
native is to argue through the much more arcane concept of futility, or is
there a way to finesse the futility approach?
Futility is difficult to define, and thus difficult to argue. Philosophers,
for example, will point out that existence is "good," even a "good of last
resort," and anything which preserves existence, no matter how bleak or
pointless that existence might be, cannot be deemed futile. They will be
joined .by a group of individuals who have been called Vitalists. Vitalists
hold that life, even a life shorn of all meaning or promise, is sacred. They
insist that any shred of life must be prolonged by whatever means neces-
sary. Futility arguments are in for a rough ride in the courts, and to the
courts they will most assuredly be taken.
An answer might be found by examining the goal of medicine and, fur-
ther, by seeing how it satisfies the principle of respect for dignity. One
can cast the goal of medicine as being the relief of suffering, insofar as it
can be done. It is a large order, and it has been made only a bit larger by
Callahan,2 who adds to it the attainment of a normal life span. The modi-
2. DANIEL CALLAHAN, SET-rING LIMrrs: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING SOCIETY
(1987).
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fication is acceptable, however, and adds no appreciable difficulty. One
might point out here that the approach of the World Health Organization
(and others) would insist on making medicine responsible for everything
from the vacillations of the Gizei and the Bundesbank to the Ivory Trade.
To be sure, suffering is not solely the provenance of illness, but physicians
will be kept quite occupied if they stick to what they know and do best.
The ancient admonition "to cure sometimes, to heal often, to comfort
always" is still a tall enough order.
Cassell3 reminds us that it is precisely the attack on the integrity of the
person that produces suffering. It is in the unhinging of the individual
and his personal integrity that suffering is produced. An analogy might
help. The person who enters an emergency department following the loss
of the tip of his left little finger is certainly in pain. Is he suffering? If he
is a concert violinist, that loss is rightly seen by him as the end of a career,
the disintegration of his person. He will be in pain, but more to the point,
he will be suffering. The relief of suffering then, ties in neatly with re-
spect for the dignity of the individual. Suffering is a personal and an indi-
vidual emotion.
Are we at odds with rights? What rights are inherent and which are
granted by society? If we view rights in the perspective of what is right,
we have a different but compatible perspective. It would seem that
Michael Walzer4 was doing just this when he spoke of what was right for
society to do. He spoke of the obligation society bears to provide to its
members a decent level of medical care. This statement is pithy indeed,
but we can tease out of it the components that will fit a proposed scheme
very nicely and satisfy the respect for dignity that is mandated. It does
not, however, blend easily with autonomy.
Civil rights are those rights that are bestowed by laws enacted by a
society. That society must agree to share certain very basic beliefs, values,
and responsibilities that have to do with the natural law. The natural law
has more to do with the right. Thus, the society which bestows rights
must do so informed by and structured by the natural law which is to say,
the right.
Because rights imply a claim on society, that same society must agree
to honor those claims (otherwise the rights become, in effect, non-exis-
tent). So the effectiveness of these rights depends both on the willingness
3. Eric J. Cassel, The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine, 306 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 639 (1982).
4. MICHAEL J. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
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and the ability of that society to honor them. One thing is immediately
apparent. Society cannot bestow, or honor, rights which will, if they are
claimed, destroy that society. Thus, society can and must ask for some
sacrifice of individual good for the common good. This is a basic societal
concept of right.
Arnold J. Toynbee in his work, A Study of History,5 opined that civili-
zations fall because they overdo the elaboration of their best idea. The
idea of the rights of the individual is arguably one of the best of democ-
racy, and perhaps of western civilization.
Now it would be ideal if, in claiming a right, the individual would think
first of duty to society. But this is to expect, and to ask, a standard of
altruism to which few, precious few, would rise. So society, then, is in
effect forbidden to honor claims which are not right (good) and is, at the
other end of the spectrum, strongly enjoined to respect those which best
contribute to the common good. Only an absolute good, then, is abso-
lutely binding, but of coursegradations occur. And as the good descends
from that absolute (whatever that may be, if it even exists), society has a
lesser duty to honor such claims and may abridge them in ways which
best protect the good of all its members. It is derivative then that mem-
bers have a corresponding duty to limit their claims so that the integrity
of the society is preserved.
The attention given to autonomy can be seen to come from an atomiza-
tion of the individual, a process that encourages the individual to seek his
own perception of good to the derogation of the society.
Does this advocate communitarianism? Not really. The communitari-
ans adhere to a concept that community is composed of egos. Classical
philosophy, however, would instruct that the "we" is more fundamental
than the "I" (the "ego"), rather than being derived from it. Society re-
turns more to the "we" than we can ever contribute to it. The Samaritan
is rewarded more by the wounded man than the wounded man is re-
warded by the Samaritan.
Rather than sacrificing anything by returning to a philosophy of indi-
vidual dignity, society enriches itself by turning to its members for a no-
tion of societal obligation. Can we expect them to do this of their own
volition? We need not. Society can and must regulate what is to be given
so that it has the resources to honor claims, and to honor all similar
claims in a similar way, a favorite and valued instruction of Margaret
Somerville. It is only by setting limits that it can do so.
5. ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (1947).
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Will limits thus set be equitable and just from their inception? We
would hope that they would be, but we can only strive. As inequities
come to light, they can be righted, but it is incumbent on society to make
a start.It must be aware from the outset that, as C.S. Lewis6 put it so in-
sightfully, "Every power man has is a power over man." This imposes the
gravest obligation to act wisely. Wisdom in intent will provide the first
steps. To act otherwise would subvert the negative moral imperative so
important to the best construct of autonomy: first, do no harm.
What is the pertinence to the footsoldier, to the man who serves in the
frontlines? The primary doctor, and I avoid the handle "provider" as be-
ing just one step above the previously proposed "vendor," is dedicated to
patient advocacy. He has survived having this assailed as paternalism,
but his ethic is, or should be, that of advocate for his patient. He both
respects that patient's autonomy and realizes that it must be limited. But
limited by whom? Not by him. His role must be to press for whatever is
available that will be in the patient's best interest. But he can recognize
limits, and does, in fact, within the present system. Some things are out
of reach, simply unobtainable, and will be thus represented by him. He is
comfortable with that role.
Because it is the continued ability of society to provide for its members
that is at stake, it must be that same society which clearly sets those limits,
realising that to attempt to do more would impair society's ability to pro-
vide the decent care which is society's responsibility. The physician can
then say with honesty, "I will do everything that I can" and honor that
Hippocratic mandate within the properly set bounds of a just and equita-
ble system.
6. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY (1958).
